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[357] 
Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy 
Protection of the First Amendment Should 
Be More Like That of the Fourth 
Marc Jonathan Blitz* 
The 1969 case Stanley v. Georgia forbade the government from restricting the books that 
an individual may read or the films he may watch “in the privacy of his own home.” 
Since that time, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Stanley’s protection 
applies solely within the physical boundaries of the home: While obscene books or films 
are protected inside of the home, they are not protected en route to it—whether in a 
package sent by mail, in a suitcase one is carrying to one’s house, or in a stream of data 
obtained through the Internet. 
However adequate this narrow reading of Stanley may have been in the four decades 
since the case was decided, it is ill-suited to the twenty-first century, where the in-home 
cultural life protected by the Court in Stanley inevitably spills over into, or connects with, 
electronic realms beyond it. Individuals increasingly watch films not, as the defendant in 
Stanley did, by bringing an eight millimeter film or other physical copy of the film into 
their house, but by streaming it through the Internet. Especially as eReaders, such as the 
Kindle, and tablets, such as the iPad, proliferate, individuals read books by downloading 
digital copies of them. They store their own artistic and written work not in a desk drawer 
or in a safe, but in the “cloud” of data storage offered to them on far-away servers. 
Thus, I argue that courts should revisit and revise their understanding of Stanley v. 
Georgia in the same way that Katz v. United States revised Fourth Amendment law in 
1967—by holding that the privacy it protected is not limited to the physical boundaries of 
the home (as United States v. Olmstead had held in 1928) but covers wire-line 
communications and other electronic environments in which individuals have an 
expectation of privacy. This is not to say that the Court’s understanding of Stanley v. 
Georgia should be revised in precisely the same way. However, Stanley v. Georgia 
should, at a minimum, be extended to protect web-based interactions, where use of an 
electronic resource outside of the home, such as the Internet, is an integral component of 
the act of possessing, viewing, or reading cultural material. 
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This originates from within our environment. It has to, 
because nothing can come in from outside except words. 
—Philip K. Dick, Ubik1 
 
It isn’t just worn out; it’s forty years obsolete. . . . [T]he 
damn thing is antiquated. Junk it. Forget about it. 
—Philip K. Dick, Ubik2 
Introduction 
2009 was a year that saw an unusually large number of historic 
fortieth anniversary celebrations, among them, those marking the 
landing of Apollo on the moon, the creation of the Internet, the 
Woodstock music festival, the first episode of Sesame Street, and the 
New York Mets’s improbable World Series victory.3 All of these events 
happened in 1969, some with more fanfare and news coverage than 
others. To this list of anniversaries, lawyers and legal scholars were able 
to add their own, as they reflected upon the lasting significance of the 
 
 1. Philip K. Dick, Ubik (1969), reprinted in Four Novels of the 1960s, at 609, 781 (Jonathan 
Lethem ed., 2007). 
 2. Id. at 710. 
 3. See Julie Bloom et al., 1969, N.Y. Times (July 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/packages/ 
html/arts/20090717-1969-feature/ (listing and providing a slide show of photographs depicting 
highlights from 1969); see also Hank Stuever, Enough Already! All ’69 Anniversaries Should be 86ed, 
Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 2009, at E2; JohnnyB, The 40th Anniversary of 1969, Late for the Sky (Aug. 9, 
2009 3:28 PM), http://johnnyb-lateforthesky.blogspot.com/2009/08/40th-anniversary-of-1969.html. 
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Supreme Court’s landmark school speech decision in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District.4 
But there was another important First Amendment case decided in 
1969, the fortieth anniversary of which passed far more quietly: the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Stanley v. Georgia.5 The silence was, in a 
sense, appropriate, for instead of bringing the case into line with evolving 
technologies, the Supreme Court’s subsequent glosses on Stanley have 
kept it as narrow in scope as it was when it was first decided, and 
arguably, have made it even narrower. Stanley held that even though 
obscene movies or books can generally be constitutionally prohibited or 
punished when in public—because courts view such expression as falling 
outside the bounds of the First Amendment—such materials are 
nonetheless protected by the First Amendment when read or viewed by a 
person in her own home.6 To hold otherwise and to allow the State to 
regulate which books we read or films we watch within the home, the 
Court declared, would come too close to permitting the “control [of] 
men’s minds” and clearly at odds with our First Amendment 
commitment to freedom of thought.7 
But while these words have been cited by numerous courts in the 
subsequent decades, their significance has been tightly limited by a series 
of decisions holding that material protected once inside the home is not 
constitutionally shielded en route to it. The Court began imposing such 
limitations in a pair of decisions issued only two years after Stanley. In 
United States v. Reidel, it rejected the petitioner’s argument that the State 
of California violated his First Amendment rights when it indicted him 
under obscenity laws for mailing three copies of a booklet called “The 
True Facts About Imported Pornography.”8 “Whatever the scope of the 
‘right to receive’ referred to in Stanley,” the Court said, “it is not so 
broad as to” establish a “right to do business in obscenity and use the 
mails in the process.”9 In United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 
it went further and held constitutional the seizure of photographs that 
the owner had not shared or sent to anyone else—but was rather carrying 
in his own suitcase on a return trip from Europe.10 A “port of entry,” said 
the Court, “is not a traveler’s home.”11 Indeed, obscenity could be seized 
“when discovered in the luggage of a returning foreign traveler even 
 
 4. See generally Symposium, Tinker Turns 40: Freedom of Expression at School and Its Meaning 
for American Democracy, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 1119 (2009). 
 5. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 6. Id. at 565. 
 7. Id. 
 8. 402 U.S. 351, 353 (1971). 
 9. Id. at 355–56. 
 10. 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971). 
 11. Id. at 365. 
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though intended solely for his private use.”12 Two years later, in 1973, the 
Court continued the narrowing of Stanley in a trio of decisions issued on 
the same day. In United States v. Orito, it found constitutional the 
government’s seizure of obscene films from a storage area of a private 
airline.13 In United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, it 
likewise approved the seizure of films from a package carried by 
someone entering the United States from Mexico.14 In Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, the case where the Court made clear that the State 
may punish the screening of pornographic films, even to willing adult 
viewers, the Court emphasized again that Stanley had force only within 
the home.15 In all three of these decisions, Chief Justice Burger asserted 
that the freedom of thought protected in Stanley v. Georgia was without 
force not only in public channels of commerce, but everywhere in public 
life: There is no “zone of constitutionally protected privacy [that] follows 
[obscene] material when it is moved outside the home area protected by 
Stanley.”16 
In recent years, lower courts have uniformly held that pornography 
may be seized or punished not only in the mail or in physical 
transportation, but also in electronic channels of communication. For 
example, in United States v. Whorley, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit stated that obscene materials obtained through e-mail or 
through an “interactive computer service” are not within the scope of 
Stanley v. Georgia’s protection.17 Other courts have reached the same 
conclusion.18 More specifically, they have upheld the application of 18 
U.S.C. § 1462 to e-mails received at home or webpages viewed at home. 
Section 1462 provides,  
Whoever . . . knowingly uses any . . . interactive computer service . . . for 
carriage in interstate or foreign commerce . . . [of] any obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, or filthy . . . writing . . . or other matter of indecent 
character[,] . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .19 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit likewise rejected, in United 
States v. Extreme Associate, Inc., the notion that, in understanding the 
 
 12. Id. at 376 (emphasis added). 
 13. 413 U.S. 139, 140 (1973). 
 14. 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973). 
 15. 413 U.S. 49, 57, 66–67 (1973). 
 16. Orito, 413 U.S. at 141–42. 
 17. 550 F.3d 326, 332–33 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 18. See United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2010) (allowing prosecution 
of individuals charged with displaying an obscene movie trailer over an “interactive computer 
service”); United States v. McCoy, 678 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1365–73, (M.D. Ga. 2009); see also United 
States v. Little, No. 8:07-CR-170-T-24MSS, 2008 WL 151875, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2008) (finding 
Stanley allows government to seize and criminalize pornography transmitted “over the Internet”). 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (2006). 
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scope of Stanley v. Georgia, “a new analytical path is necessary in 
Internet cases.”20 
Some scholars have argued that in light of such precedent, Stanley is 
better understood as a privacy case than as a First Amendment case: 
Instead of marking out a sphere of activity as within the realm of 
protected speech or receipt of information, it marks out a particular place 
(namely, the home) that is a realm of individual sovereignty, instead of 
state control.21 The Supreme Court itself has indicated as much, 
emphasizing that Stanley’s holding was “narrow”22 and stating that it was 
“hardly more than a reaffirmation that ‘a man’s home is his castle.’”23 
But these observations hardly foreclose all questions about Stanley’s 
meaning, especially as emerging technologies expand and transform the 
“castle” walls in which individuals enclose themselves. Modern 
computing power and networking technology not only allow individuals 
to rapidly deliver reading or viewing materials to their homes through 
the Web or digital downloading, but also to create virtual extensions of 
their homes. More specifically, many of the cultural activities we engage 
in inside the home—reading, watching a video, surfing the Web—can 
now be performed in the privacy of a digital home instead of a physical 
one. Instead of relaxing in our living rooms, we might do so in the much 
more “spacious” living room of a virtual mansion we acquire in Second 
Life24 or another virtual world.25 Instead of buying a safe or chest to store 
paper documents in a closet, we might buy virtual space in the “cloud” of 
computer-based storage that numerous companies, such as Google,26 
Apple,27 or Dropbox,28 provide for people to store digital files outside of 
their homes.29 Instead of buying and reading a physical book, many 
individuals armed with an eReader, an iPad, or another tablet computer 
 
 20. 431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2005). The court added that Internet transmission of pornography is 
not beyond the scope of Stanley’s First Amendment protection but is unprotected by any parallel right 
to freedom of thought or autonomy that might arise out of the substantive due process rights of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 159. 
 21. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as 
Act and Idea, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1564, 1576 (1988) (“[B]ecause the Court refused to own up to the 
implications of its holding in Stanley, the case can only be understood as a privacy decision . . . .”). 
 22. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108 (1990). 
 23. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973). 
 24. Second Life, http://secondlife.com/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 25. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 
5, 30 (2004) (describing how individuals gather in “virtual living room[s]” in Blazing Falls and other 
virtual worlds, and how one can “buy a completed mansion” there). 
 26. See Google Docs, http://www.google.com/google-d-s/documents/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 27. See Apple MobileMe, http://www.apple.com/mobileme/features/idisk.html (last visited Dec. 
17, 2010).  
 28. See Dropbox, https://www.dropbox.com/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 29. See Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, The Internet Industry Is on a Cloud—Whatever that 
May Mean, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at A1 (“[In cloud computing, i]nformation is stored and 
processed on computers somewhere else—‘in the clouds’—and brought back to your screen.”). 
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might read a digital book that—unlike its physical counterpart—remains 
electronically tethered to and, in some cases, subject to alteration or 
deletion by the company that provided it.30 
Are these private cyberspaces covered in any part by the Stanley 
decision’s insistence on safeguarding a person’s “right to be free from 
state inquiry into the contents of his library”?31 Or does the storing of 
that library in the cloud or the act of linking it to the Internet through a 
computer or a digital reader open it up to state control? May the 
government thus mandate the deletion of an already-downloaded digital 
book, even though Stanley prevents seizure of the same book in its 
physical form? Is it the case, in other words, that the only home that 
serves as a person’s “castle” for First Amendment purposes is the brick-
and-mortar home she sleeps and eats in, rather than the numerous virtual 
and electronic extensions of her home in which she can now find 
additional privacy? 
The answer to this question might seem clear, based on the 
consistent denial by the lower courts of Stanley’s protection to 
“interactive computer services.”32 In a sense, Stanley is frozen in time as a 
result of these interpretations: It protects only physical spaces, not virtual 
homes, digitally-created spaces on the Internet, or the private sensory 
enclaves we create and use outside the home with laptops, portable DVD 
players, and other electronic devices. Thus, the only home protected for 
First Amendment purposes is the physical space. But, I suggest here that 
this answer is deeply problematic, and perhaps simply wrong. For it 
applies assumptions to First Amendment protection of private 
information that have long been discredited in another, similar area of 
constitutional protection for liberty and privacy: the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches. Many years 
before the federal courts held that information channeled to a home 
through an Internet connection lies outside the purely in-home realm 
protected by Stanley, the Court’s 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United 
States came to virtually the same conclusion about phone wires: “[O]ne 
who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires 
intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and . . . the wires 
 
 30. See Brad Stone & Motoko Rich, Companies Race to Rule the E-Books, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 
2010, at B1 (describing the market for eBooks as “nascent but booming”); Andrew Berg, Amazon: 
eBook Sales Surpass Hardcovers, WirelessWeek (July 20, 2010), http://www.wirelessweek.com/News/ 
2010/07/Business-Amazon-eBook-Sales-Hardcovers-Mobile-Content/ (“[A] lower price point for 
eReaders is stimulating dramatic growth in eBook sales.”); see also Nicole A. Ozer & Jennifer A. 
Lynch, Protecting Reader Privacy in Digital Books, Ass’n for the Advancement of Artificial 
Intelligence Symposium, Mar. 2010, at 136, 138, available at http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/SSS/ 
SSS10/paper/view/1041/1500 (explaining that providers of eBooks can monitor the books they have 
provided and even “delete whole books”). 
 31. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).  
 32. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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beyond his house and messages while passing over them are not within 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”33 
But Olmstead no longer provides the rule for what is and is not 
covered by Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches. In 1967, the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead in Katz v. 
United States.34 It held that individuals have a constitutional right to 
protection against unfettered government monitoring not only inside of 
their homes, but also in various electronic environments, on phone lines, 
and in public phone booths.35 “[T]he Fourth Amendment” it said, 
“protects people, not places . . . . [W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”36 Under the modern formulation of Katz (based chiefly upon 
the concurrence by Justice Harlan in that case), individuals are protected 
from government monitoring everywhere they have an “expectation of 
privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”37 
This expectation depends heavily upon the nature of the place 
where they are located, but it is not only the home itself where privacy 
from government can be expected: As the Court said in a later case, 
“people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they 
step from their homes onto the public sidewalks.”38 Why then are they 
shorn of their First Amendment right to private possession or viewing of 
reading materials when they step from their homes onto these sidewalks? 
Why does the Court insist there is no “zone of constitutionally protected 
privacy [that] follows” a reader or film viewer “when [she goes] outside 
the home area protected by Stanley”?39 Freedom of thought and 
intellectual exploration is, after all, no less fundamental to our 
constitutional order than freedom from unreasonable searches. Such 
freedom has been described by the Court as “the matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”40 Why, 
then, should the now forty-one-year-old case of Stanley v. Georgia 
adhere to constitutional assumptions similar to those rejected in 
Olmstead v. United States, decided forty-one years before Stanley? 
I argue here that it should not—that it is no longer tenable to isolate 
Stanley’s freedom-of-thought protection from technological development 
and public space. This is not to say that the shield Stanley provided to 
pornography and to other low-value speech can nullify all state 
 
 33. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
 34. 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 351–52. 
 37. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 38. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
 39. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141–42 (1973). 
 40. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
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restriction of such speech in public life. As Chief Justice White correctly 
pointed out in United States v. Reidel, the Court made it clear in Stanley 
that obscenity was still, in most circumstances, outside the protection of 
the First Amendment.41 There may be good reason to think the Court is 
mistaken to deny First Amendment protection to obscene speech,42 but if 
that is true, then this is a mistake the Court largely endorsed, rather than 
repudiated, in Stanley. What the Stanley decision did not endorse is a 
First Amendment regime that would leave individuals subject to state 
control of the book, film, and photo libraries in their own homes. 
Freezing Stanley’s holding in time so that it remains applicable only to 
the technology of the late 1960s leaves individuals vulnerable to such 
cultural micromanagement from the outside; it threatens to let Stanley’s 
freedom-of-thought protection become an anachronism, as our living 
rooms become more and more electronically (and inextricably) 
intertwined with sites outside of the home, such as the Internet servers 
from which we download videos and websites. 
Consequently, I suggest here that courts bring Stanley’s freedom-of-
thought protection up-to-date technologically and put it in line with 
similar privacy protections in Fourth Amendment law by adopting two 
principles for applying the case in the future. First, they should recognize 
that it is not always possible to distinguish between the act of privately 
possessing and viewing a film—which Stanley held to be protected—and 
the act of delivering that film through channels of commerce—which 
Reidel held not to be protected. There are circumstances where these two 
activities merge into one another, where one can access and view text or 
video in one’s home only while simultaneously transmitting it through 
wire lines from the outside world. This is particularly true in cloud 
computing. A web user can see text or video only as it is delivered 
through the Internet from outside. In such circumstances, Stanley should 
protect the transmission of a film as well as its possession, because it can 
protect the latter only if it also protects the former. 
Second, as Judge Roger Gregory recently noted in a dissent in 
United States v. Whorley, even the cases narrowing Stanley did not, 
before the decision in Whorley, expressly allow the State to bar or punish 
“the sending or receiving of obscene materials [that] involve[] neither a 
 
 41. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354 (1971) (“[T]he States retain broad power to 
regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the 
privacy of his own home.” (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))). 
 42. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Obscenity: An Outdated Concept for the Twenty-First Century, 
10 Nexus J. Op. 21, 22 (2005) (“Miller has long been antithetical to sound First Amendment theory 
[and] should be overruled.”). 
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commercial transaction nor any kind of victim.”43 Courts should adopt 
Judge Gregory’s Fourth Circuit dissent as the majority rule. 
 Part I of this Article looks closely at some of the electronic 
extensions of the home I mentioned earlier—the “cloud” of computer 
space we use on far-away servers, virtual environments like Second Life, 
and digital books, like those available on Kindle or iPad. It notes that 
existing precedent in Fourth Amendment law is likely to provide a basis 
for barring warrantless State searches of many of these new private 
electronic environments, but that the same cannot be said of the First 
Amendment rights recognized in Stanley. Part II then argues that this 
technological freezing of Stanley’s scope should be abandoned—because 
it is neither the case that (1) Stanley’s freedom-of-thought protection is 
inappropriate in cyberspace or in the other private electronic spaces 
available outside the home, nor that (2) there is something unique about 
the home that makes it the only environment appropriate for Stanley’s 
protection. 
I.  The Changing Nature of the Right to Read: Privacy Rights in 
the Cloud, in eReading, and in Virtual Worlds 
In the early twenty-first century, the cultural life of the home and of 
private individual reflection is largely pieced together as we draw upon, 
and react to, a continuous stream of information delivered from the 
outside world.44 As our in-home reading and video watching migrates to 
electronic spaces, such as the cloud and other virtual environments, does 
Stanley’s protection for freedom of thought and receipt of information 
move with them? Or does our movement into a future, always-connected 
home life necessarily entail leaving Stanley’s freedom of thought behind? 
I will begin to approach such questions by saying more about the 
three specific examples I have discussed above: cloud computing, virtual 
environments, and eReaders. I then explain why these environments, 
although likely denied protection under the current understanding of 
Stanley, may well receive some Fourth Amendment protection against 
warrantless searches. 
A. Cloud Computing 
Increasingly, written documents we once composed on a desk and 
stored in a drawer, a wooden chest, or a safe are now composed and 
 
 43. 569 F.3d 211, 212 (4th Cir. 2009) (Gregory, J., dissenting), denying reh’g en banc to 550 F.3d 
326 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 44. See Adam Ostrow, CES Shows Us the Internet of the Future, CNN.com (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/01/11/mashable.ces.wrapup/index.html ([If the CES convention] is 
any indication, the 2010s are going to bring about another quantum leap in the way we work, play and 
communicate as the Internet becomes embedded in virtually everything we do. . . . [T]he Internet [is] 
becoming as ubiquitous as electricity . . . .”). 
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stored electronically, in “the cloud.”45 “Cloud computing,” as one writer 
explains the concept, is “a data-hosting method in which information or 
services can be accessed by users through the [I]nternet.”46 
“Information,” as a Wall Street Journal primer on the subject explains, 
“is stored and processed on computers somewhere else—‘in the 
clouds’—and brought back to your screen.”47 Like digital information 
that is loaded onto, and remains on, one’s own computer, the digital 
information that we summon from the cloud can take any number of 
forms: It can be a document that the user herself has written or is in the 
process of writing;48 it can be a book or a magazine article written by 
someone else;49 it can be a photograph, a drawing, or an album full of 
photographs and drawings;50 it can be a movie or another video.51 
Moreover, the text or image accessed from distant computer services 
often gives little clear indication of its origins. The text that one opens 
and edits in Google Docs, for example, looks almost identical to the way 
it would look if it were stored on one’s own computer.52 Indeed, the cloud 
can mimic one’s own, in-home computer in another way: Apart from 
 
 45. See Fowler & Worthen, supra note 29; see also Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: 
Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. on Telecomm. & High 
Tech. L. 359, 361 (2010) (“Over 69% of Americans now use webmail services, store data online, or 
otherwise use software applications such as word processing programs whose functionality is in the 
cloud.” (citing John B. Horrigan, Cloud Computing Gains in Currency, Pew Research Ctr. (Sept. 12, 
2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/948/cloud-computing-gains-in-currency)); William Jeremy Robison, 
Note, Free at What Cost? Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 Geo. 
L.J. 1195, 1203 (2010) (“Widespread consumer embrace of early cloud computing offerings suggests 
that a meaningful shift is underway, rather than a passing fad.”). 
 46. Brian X. Chen, Apple’s New Data Center Likely to Focus on Cloud Computing, Wired 
Gadget Lab (Aug. 17, 2009, 4:33 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2009/08/apple-cloud/. 
 47. See Fowler & Worthen, supra note 29. 
 48. See John Arlidge, Are Our Heads in the Cloud?, Sunday Times (London), Aug. 9. 2009, at 42 
(describing a firm that uses the cloud to store and edit “thousands of files” including “spreadsheets, e-
mails, contacts” and a table that tracks the progress of current projects); see also Google Docs, supra 
note 26 (“Create and share documents on the web and access them from any computer or smart 
phone.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, Zinio Magazine, http://imgs.zinio.com/faq/cs.htm 
(select query “What are the most basic things I need to know to get started?”) (last visited Dec. 17, 
2010) (“Zinio gives you two great ways to view your magazines on a computer: online using a web 
browser or offline using the Zinio Reader software. The Online Reader gives you the ability to access 
your magazines from any web browser with Adobe Flash installed.”). 
 50. See SheldonW, Media Distribution, Mobile Entertainment and the Cloud, The Digital 
Lifestyle (Oct. 17, 2009, 2:10 PM), http://thedigitallifestyle.com/cs/TDL/b/cloud/archive/2009/10/17/ 
mobile_2D00_computing_2D00_the_2D00_cloud.aspx (“I . . . use public cloud services such as Google 
Apps, Microsoft Workspace Live, Spotify, YouTube, Flickr and Picasa to store, access and share 
documents, videos, photo’s [sic] and music . . . .”); see also Photobucket, http://photobucket.com (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2010) (“Upload, manage, and share your photos and videos for FREE!”). 
 51. See Company History, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/t/company_history (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2010) (“YouTube allows people to easily upload and share video clips on www.YouTube.com 
and across the Internet through websites, mobile devices, blogs, and email.”). 
 52. Google Docs, supra note 26 (noting that the documents one sees and edits online have a 
“familiar desktop feel”). 
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displaying text or image files that are actually on a server miles away, it 
can also allow use of computer applications, such as a Word processing 
program, that are actually running on that far-away server.53 
Indeed, as R. Bruce Wells points out, these “online applications 
have already become almost indistinguishable from their offline 
counterparts.”54 And as Wells observes, the cloud’s ability to both 
substitute for, and perfectly simulate, in-home computing presents a 
significant challenge to legal rules that offer protection to only one of 
these environments and not the other.55 
This is not the only challenge the rise of cloud computing raises for 
the future relevance of Stanley, however. Assume that it is possible to 
provide computer users with unmistakably clear warnings that a file they 
are viewing, or a program they are running, is actually coming from a 
distant server. Would such a warning by itself justify denying them the 
protection Stanley offers to private reading or film watching? It is not 
entirely clear that it would. After all, the activities a person is engaging in 
by accessing the cloud—reading a text, viewing a picture, or watching a 
film, all entirely within their home, and all in isolation from other 
people—are the digital equivalents of those protected in Stanley. If, as 
the Supreme Court stated in Kyllo v. United States, the Fourth 
Amendment protects not only against the government spying on us 
through “physical invasions of the home,” but also in “their functional 
equivalent,”56 it is plausible that the First Amendment should likewise 
protect not only against censorship through physical confiscation of 
books and films from our living rooms, but also the functional equivalent 
of such confiscation. 
Moreover, if the digital, internet-based variants of reading books, 
viewing pictures, or watching videos were to become the primary or 
exclusive means of engaging in such activities, then Stanley’s First 
Amendment protections would either have to be extended to cover the 
Internet, or effectively suffer extinction. 
B. Digital Books 
Another threat to Stanley, similar to that generated by the 
emergence of cloud computing, is the increasing popularity of digital 
books. One of the most widely-quoted passages in Stanley is its insistence 
that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that the State 
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books 
 
 53. See Arlidge, supra note 48 (“In the cloud, the internet becomes our operating system. We use 
online software that runs in our browser to create the files we need.”). 
 54. R. Bruce Wells, Note, The Fog of Cloud Computing: Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the 
Blurring of Online and Offline Content, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 223, 233 (2009). 
 55. Id. at 234.  
 56. 533 U.S. 27, 44 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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he may read . . . .”57 But this statement assumed that the act of reading a 
book “sitting alone in [one’s] own house” was an act isolated from the 
public world. The act of reading a modern eBook, by contrast, is less 
immune to outside influence.58 In July 2009, under pressure from the 
copyright owner who did not want unauthorized copies distributed 
through Kindle, Amazon deleted George Orwell’s 1984 and other 
eBooks from Kindle users who had purchased and, in some cases, started 
to read them.59 Yet it is easy to conceive of a situation where Amazon or 
other eBook providers restrict content not in response to private legal 
action, but rather in response to a government order. Imagine, for 
example, a situation akin to that in Stanley, where a person buys and 
downloads an eBook or digital magazine with arguably obscene contents, 
at a time before any court has found them to be obscene. If a court later 
determines that the material is obscene, might the State then require a 
bookseller to remotely delete reading materials that the police could not, 
under the holding of Stanley, confiscate physically? The State, after all, 
could certainly impose a harsh penalty for, and order the removal of, 
obscene material from a website over which it has jurisdiction, even if 
this prevents a person from linking to such material from the computers 
in their own living rooms. It is, thus, conceivable that officials would 
likewise have authority to order an eBook provider to take all measures 
possible on its own servers to put a stop to the transmission of obscene 
reading materials. 
Moreover, while Stanley itself concerned obscenity, one can imagine 
similar questions arising with respect to other forms of speech that are 
classified as “low value” by courts and, as such, are given little-to-no 
protection under the First Amendment. Take, for example, books 
determined to be libelous. In a blog posting responding to Amazon’s 
remote deletions, Eugene Volokh asked whether Amazon would be 
justified if, worried about possible lawsuits, it remotely deleted an 
already downloaded digital book that “contains a libel—or discloses 
information that invades someone’s privacy.”60 Such a question has 
important First Amendment implications: Although defamation exposes 
one to civil liability, not criminal punishment, the Supreme Court has 
long made it clear that state tort rules allowing people to sue for 
defamation can infringe First Amendment rights if they restrict or chill 
 
 57. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
 58. See Ozer & Lynch, supra note 30, at 3 (“Digital book providers can easily track what books an 
individual considers, how often a given book is read, how long a given page is viewed, and even what 
notes are written in the ‘margins.’”).  
 59. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics from Kindle. (One Is ‘1984.’), N.Y. Times, July 
18, 2009, at B1. 
 60. See Eugene Volokh, (Hypothetical) Removal of Libelous Books from Customers’ Kindles? 
The Volokh Conspiracy (July 19, 2009, 7:39 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1248046786.shtml. 
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protected speech.61 While the Court’s concerns about such restriction and 
chilling effects have, in the past, been focused on public discussion,62 it is 
conceivable that the interaction of emerging eReader technology could 
give rise to a new kind of chilling—one which causes book providers to 
remotely erase or edit the contents of the private libraries that Stanley 
was meant to shield. 
While Stanley was, itself, about obscenity, the right it found in the 
First Amendment—“the right to be free from state inquiry into [and 
control over] the contents of [one’s] library”63—might well protect an 
individual from state measures aimed at cleansing that library not only of 
obscenity, but also of other types of low-value speech.64 
The State would arguably violate one’s right to read the books of 
one’s choice if it required a book provider to remotely delete eBooks one 
has already downloaded to a device. Drawing on cases holding Stanley 
inapplicable to the Internet, courts might likewise hold Stanley to be 
inapplicable here, because such electronic books, unlike their physical 
counterparts, are stored in a device that remains linked and accessible to 
a company in the outside world that has contractually retained some 
control over the nature of the book. As Julie Cohen pointed out in 1996, 
when increasing amounts of reading materials were moving online, “[t]he 
same technologies that enable readers to access digitally stored 
works . . . also . . . enable copyright owners to generate precise and 
detailed records of such access.”65 As Nicole Ozer and Jennifer Lynch 
 
 61. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (“Although this is a civil lawsuit 
between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to 
impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that 
that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by 
statute.”). 
 62. See id. at 269 (“The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is 
secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions.” (emphasis added)). 
 63. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
 64. This issue has hardly produced any case law, since, outside of obscenity, the Government has 
not prosecuted people for the possession or viewing of speech in their own homes. In State v. Poe, the 
Idaho Supreme Court rejected the idea that Stanley’s holding would apply to “the use of fighting 
words” uttered within the home (although it held that the statute at issue was overbroad, because it 
criminalized some speech that, unlike fighting words, was protected). 88 P.3d 704, 720–21, 723 (Idaho 
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The fighting words analysis is different from that of 
obscenity, however, because the harm that fighting words cause to third parties—the violent response 
they tend to provoke—can be just as significant whether such words are used inside or outside the 
home. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining fighting words as words 
“which, by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” and 
making no reference to whether they are said in the home or in public). Moreover, the punishment, in 
that case, is directed at someone who is speaking, not simply listening to or obtaining information. 
Someone who is reading or watching defamatory information or commercial speech, by contrast, may 
have a claim that—like the defendant in Stanley—she should be able to choose to continue doing so in 
her own home, free from state restriction. 
 65. Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in 
Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981, 983 (1996). 
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have observed more recently, current eBook providers take advantage of 
such monitoring capacities: Amazon, for example, “retains information 
about the books, magazine subscriptions, newspapers and other digital 
content on the Kindle and the reader’s interaction with that content.”66 
The lower court cases denying Stanley’s protections to the Internet 
suggest that new digital books and videos fall beyond the scope of 
Stanley when they are transmitted by, and remain controllable through, 
electronic pathways.67 If material is unprotected when it is accessed on an 
interactive computer service connected to channels of interstate 
commerce,68 one would guess this also to be true when such material is 
accessed on an interactive mobile device. But as noted above, this would 
be an odd result in a world where most of our reading is done on 
eReaders. If the library that Stanley vigorously protected from state 
control soon becomes a library of eBooks, instead of paperbacks and 
hardcovers, the protection that Stanley offers to that library should 
survive this technological shift. 
C. Virtual Worlds 
Existing computing technology not only allows individuals to swap 
their file cabinets and bookshelves for virtual equivalents, it allows them 
to build or buy an entire virtual house. Individuals who can only afford to 
rent a small studio apartment in the real world might be able to purchase 
a custom-built mansion for themselves in a virtual world. The website for 
the virtual world, Second Life, for example, invites users to “buy virtual 
land and build your dream house”69 and offers premium members “[y]our 
own private virtual home.”70 Individuals cannot, of course, literally 
transport their bodies into such computer-simulated homes. The virtual 
environments currently available to consumers are not yet immersive 
enough to give them the illusion of doing so. Rather, individuals “enter” 
and explore these computer-generated houses by controlling and 
watching an animated character called an “avatar” on their computer 
screens.71 
While the houses that participants create for their avatars are just 
computer simulations, they have many of the characteristics and serve 
many of the purposes of physical homes. Like physical land, virtual 
“[r]eal estate is created or acquired, subdivided, leased, taxed and 
 
 66. Ozer & Lynch, supra note 30, at 3. 
 67. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20. 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20. 
 69. See What Is Second Life?, Second Life, http://secondlife.com/whatis (follow “Get Settled” 
hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 70. See Become a Second Life Premium Member, Second Life, http://secondlife.com/landing/ 
premium (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 71. See Avatar, Second Life, http://secondlife.com/whatis/avatar (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
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transferred in the game.”72 Like physical homes, virtual homes also play 
host to intimate activity. For example, acting through their avatars, 
individuals can have conversations with private guests, read a digital 
book on a virtual sofa,73 or watch a video on a wide-screen television.74 
They can and do engage in virtual sex.75 As Joshua Fairfield writes, the 
“anonymity” people have come to expect in “novel online environments 
has caused people to move their intimate lives online . . . .”76 
To what extent are these intimate virtual activities protected by 
Stanley? If, as I have noted earlier, the existing reading of Stanley offers 
no protection to obscene text or imagery when it is accessed or 
transmitted through “an interactive computer service,”77 then expressive 
activity one engages in, or acts as an audience for, in such a virtual home 
is far more vulnerable to state monitoring or censorship than is the 
equivalent activity in a brick-and-mortar home. Even a virtual mansion 
on a private island designed to provide maximum seclusion for its 
inhabitants would offer none of the constitutional shielding that Stanley 
provides to an old-fashioned film watcher or book reader in a tiny rented 
apartment. 
D. Fourth and First Amendment Protection for Private Electronic 
Enclaves in Public Space 
If Stanley becomes less and less applicable to home life, as that life 
becomes more and more inextricably tied to the Internet, then what is to 
be done? One possibility, as I have already noted, is to reproduce in First 
Amendment law a revolution that has already occurred in Fourth 
 
 72. Sarah Howard Jenkins, Application of the U.C.C. to Nonpayment Virtual Assets or Digital Art, 
11 Duq. Bus. L.J. 245, 247 (2009) (quoting Sean F. Kane, Asset Creation, Seclusion and Money 
Laundering in the Virtual World, Internet L. & Strategy, July 2006, at 1) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 73. See Elizabeth Corcoran, Walk on the Virtual Side, Forbes (Dec. 4, 2006), 
http://www.forbes.com/2006/12/03/second-life-online-oped-cz_ec_1204valleyletter.html; Juanita Deharo, 
Virtual Books—A Change in Direction for Second Edition, Juanita Deharo (July 10, 2020, 9:16 PM), 
http://juanitadeharo.blogspot.com/2010/07/virtual-books-change-in-direction-for.html; Second Life 
Marketplace, Second Life, https://marketplace.secondlife.com/p/Candy-CouchSofa-and-Coffee-Table/ 
1232818 (last visited Dec. 17, 2010) (a site offering virtual sofas, coffee tables, and other items for one’s 
virtual living room in Second Life). 
 74. See e.g., Punk Hobo’s Nest, X Street Second Life, https://www.xstreetsl.com/ 
modules.php?name=Marketplace&file=item&ItemID=884742 (last visited Dec. 17, 2010) (selling 
virtual sofas and television sets to Second Life residents). 
 75. See Michael Rymaszewski et al., Second Life: The Official Guide 11 (2d ed. 2008) 
(“Second Life gives you the freedom to pursue your dreams and interests. For some residents, this 
means having as much virtual sex as possible; for others, it may mean attending a religious service or 
playing combat games in spaceships they helped build.”). 
 76. Joshua Fairfield, Escape into the Panopticon: Virtual Worlds and the Surveillance Society, 118 
Yale L.J. Pocket Part 131, 134 (2009), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/ylj-online/consitutional-law/ 
741-escape-into-the-panopticon-virtual-worlds-and-the-surveillance-society. 
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20. 
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Amendment law. The Supreme Court’s 1967 decisions in Katz v. United 
States78 and in Berger v. New York79 expanded constitutional limits on 
government searches so that they shielded not only the space inside of 
the home, but also electronic channels of communication through which 
individuals carried on private conversations or other private activity. 
Berger made it clear that the Fourth Amendment did not allow 
warrantless electronic eavesdropping into the conversations people had 
over phone lines.80 Katz then expressly overruled the Court’s earlier 1928 
holding in United States v. Olmstead, finding that the Fourth Amendment 
protected “people, not places” and, more specifically, could shield 
certain areas of public space in which people had an expectation of 
privacy, such as the telephone booth that had been monitored with a 
bugging device in Katz.81 
Of course, in order for this Fourth Amendment revolution to 
provide a good model for a possible technological updating of Stanley, it 
must cover not only conversations over phone lines and in phone booths, 
but also cloud computing, eReaders, and virtual worlds. There are two 
reasons to think that, unlike the First Amendment protection of Stanley, 
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence might plausibly be viewed by 
courts as covering the “interactive computer services,” or the mobile 
device services, that make such emerging electronic spaces possible. 
One is simply that, as a result of Katz and Berger, the Fourth 
Amendment now covers phone communications that travel through 
wires, and thus, is more likely than Stanley to protect the data that flows 
to computers over those same wires. To be sure, courts have not yet 
reached a firm conclusion about the Fourth Amendment status of 
internet communications. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
recently stated, “The extent to which the Fourth Amendment provides 
protection for the contents of electronic communications in the Internet 
age is an open question.”82 As Orin Kerr notes, “the case law applying 
the Fourth Amendment to the Internet remains sparse.”83 Still, the few 
courts that have addressed the question have found that the Fourth 
Amendment likely does apply to the contents of e-mail and text 
messages.84 
 
 78. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 79. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 80. Id. at 54–55. 
 81. 389 U.S. at 351–53. 
 82. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2619 
(2010). 
 83. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1005, 1029 (2010). 
 84. See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, No. 1:06-CV-357, 2006 WL 5230332, at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 
21, 2006) (granting an injunction on the grounds that Warshak was substantially likely to succeed in his 
claim that he had a “reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal emails”), vacated on other 
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The Supreme Court has thus far avoided weighing in on the subject. 
Its decision this past term in City of Ontario v. Quon did not require such 
an answer. Since the Justices found that a police department review of its 
employees’ text messages was constitutionally permissible whether or not 
such a review counted as a Fourth Amendment “search,” they did not 
have to decide whether it did.85 The Court did, however, hint strongly in 
dicta that there is good reason to find the Fourth Amendment applicable 
to e-mail and other electronic content: “Cell phone and text message 
communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them 
to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even 
self-identification.”86 That consideration, it added “might strengthen the 
case for an expectation of privacy” of the kind necessary to trigger 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.87 Even if employees lacked such a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in an employer-provided e-mail or text 
messaging system, the Court appeared to assume that they would still 
likely be able to find such privacy in their own personal cell phone and 
Internet accounts.88 
A second reason the Fourth Amendment may well apply—not only 
to internet communications, but also to storage spaces in the cloud—is 
that the courts have extended these protections to physical spaces that 
are functionally equivalent to such storage spaces. They have held that 
the Fourth Amendment bars suspicionless searches of purses,89 
knapsacks or book bags,90 storage lockers91 and rented apartments.92 As 
the Supreme Court declared, in explaining why a student’s purse should 
not be subject to arbitrary examination by school authorities, students 
“may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, 
noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have 
 
grounds, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) 
(“[T]he transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that police officials will not 
intercept the transmission without probable cause and a search warrant.”); see also Kerr, supra note 
83, at 1026–29 (noting that cases addressing the status of e-mail or other internet content have 
generally found that the Fourth Amendment applies, while cases addressing the status of non-content 
information have generally denied Fourth Amendment protection). 
 85. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010) (“[W]e assume several propositions 
arguendo: First, Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager 
provided to him by the City; Second, petitioners’ review of the transcript constituted a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (explaining that there may not be an expectation of privacy when using company 
equipment, because employees who make use of mobile devices for personal matters can purchase 
devices on their own for such matters). 
 89. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985). 
 90. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 353 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 91. See United States v. Hamilton, 538 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2008) ([Fourth Amendment p]rivacy 
interests have been found with respect to . . . storage lockers.”). 
 92. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16–17 (1948). 
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necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing 
them onto school grounds.”93 This point applies with equal force to the 
spaces we use to store, or make portable, our private electronic files. In a 
recent comment on the Fourth Amendment’s potential application to the 
cloud, David A. Couillard points out that much of the material people 
place in such electronic storage space is at least as private as the material 
they place in familiar physical containers that the Fourth Amendment 
has insulated against arbitrary searches: They use the cloud to store 
private journals, calendars, photographs, and drafts of written work they 
are not yet ready to share.94 If, as the Supreme Court has recognized, 
students’ backpacks are “‘homes away from home’ for schoolchildren,” 
then why not also a “digital account containing many of the same types 
of materials, stored in the cloud.”95 
The same argument likely justifies extending Fourth Amendment 
protection to eReaders. A government official wishing to search a 
person’s eBook—whether by seizing and examining it, or by examining 
its contents remotely—should have to get the same warrant before doing 
so that he or she would need to search a person’s book bag. Admittedly, 
courts have held that even where document or image files have been 
downloaded to one’s own computer, they are not covered by a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” if they are accessible to outsiders 
through a file-sharing program.96 As the Ninth Circuit stated in 2007, 
“privacy expectations may be reduced if the user is advised that 
information transmitted through the network is not confidential and that 
the systems administrators may monitor communications transmitted by 
the user.”97 To the extent that those who download eBooks are aware 
that these books may still be accessed, deleted, or modified by the 
company that provided them, this arguably reduces their expectations of 
privacy. However, to the extent one’s electronic library is accessible to 
outside monitoring or control, it is the eBook provider, not the public at 
large, that has such power. Moreover, the privacy of a person’s reading 
choices has been found by courts to receive significant First Amendment 
 
 93. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. 
 94. David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to 
Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2205, 2219–21 (2009). 
 95. Id. at 2220–22 (citing Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d at 353); see also Kerr, supra note 83, at 
1021 (“A busybody landlord or building superintendent might enter an apartment to look 
around . . . . [This] possible invasion[ does] not eliminate Fourth Amendment protection in the home, 
nor should [its] online equivalent[] eliminate that protection in virtual spaces.”). 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Borowy . . . was 
clearly aware that LimeWire was a file-sharing program that would allow the public at large to access 
files in his shared folder unless he took steps to avoid it. . . . Borowy’s subjective intention not to share 
his files did not create an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the face of such widespread 
public access.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 97. United States v. Heckencamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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protection. As the Colorado Supreme Court recently said in its decision in 
Tattered Cover v. City of Thornton, “Any governmental action that 
interferes with the willingness of customers to purchase books, or 
booksellers to sell books . . . implicates First Amendment concerns.”98 
The argument for applying Fourth Amendment protections to 
virtual world homes is perhaps less clear, since they are less analogous to 
physical homes than virtual containers are to physical storage spaces. 
One does not, after all, live, sleep, and eat in a virtual home. Yet if 
people purchase such virtual homes with the understanding that they can 
use them for intimate activity, and can do so while electronically shielded 
from outside observation, it is at least plausible that they should be as 
protected by the Fourth Amendment in that context as they are in a 
rented apartment or a hotel room.99 
There are, however, some concerns that arise when the Fourth 
Amendment is applied in this context, and Couillard discusses the two 
that are most likely to do so. First, the government must get a search 
warrant, and in some cases, overcome other legal hurdles only where a 
person has “a reasonable expectation of privacy.”100 The Court has often 
held that people cannot have such a reasonable expectation in areas they 
leave open to public observation.101 And one might claim that this is true 
of Web-based storage areas or digital book shelves, which, unlike their 
physical counterparts, are not covered and obscured by a bag or 
enclosure that makes them invisible. As Couillard points out, however, 
most personal storage areas in the cloud are enclosed by other barriers, 
such as a password protection system or encryption of their contents.102 
These protections may be breached by a skilled computer expert.103 Yet 
this does not make them any less privacy-protecting than the latch on a 
purse or the lock on a safe, which may likewise be overcome by a 
pickpocket or lock-picking expert.104 
Second, even if contents stored in a private records file are 
safeguarded against observation by the world, they may be left open to 
observation by a specific third party—namely, the third party to whom 
 
 98. 44 P.3d 1044, 1052 (Colo. 2002). 
 99. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16–17 (1948) (excluding evidence gained from 
warrantless search of a hotel room); see also United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 149 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(“It is settled that a motel guest is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches 
of his or her room.”). 
 100. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 635 n.8 (1991) (“[W]herever an individual may 
harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.” (citation omitted) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967))). 
 101. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[O]bjects, activities, or 
statements that [a man] exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no 
intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”). 
 102. See Couillard, supra note 94, at 2225–26. 
 103. See id. at 2226. 
 104. See id. at 2225–26. 
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an individual entrusts the management of this information.105 For 
example, while the general public does not have access to a person’s 
private bank account information, her bank does.106 While the public 
cannot easily find out every phone number she dials, her phone company 
can.107 Under the third-party doctrine in Fourth Amendment law, the 
courts allow the government to obtain such information from banks and 
phone companies without first obtaining a warrant from a neutral 
magistrate.108 In short, once one has chosen to share information with 
third parties, it should be clear that these third parties may then share it 
with government officials.109 
This doctrine, one might argue, also applies to the information we 
bring to the cloud, store in an eReader, or reveal in virtual world 
activities, because all of this electronic behavior can generally occur only 
with the assistance of a third party willing to host some of our data on its 
servers, or in the case of eReaders, to license to us, and perhaps update, 
digital books from its content delivery systems. The material most 
consumers store in the cloud, for example, is stored and accessed 
pursuant to license agreements they enter into with companies like 
Google or Apple.110 Although many people view the digital books they 
purchase for their Kindle as equivalent to the physical books they might 
purchase from Amazon, one significant legal difference is that most of 
these books are merely “licensed.” As Amazon’s current Kindle wireless 
agreement states: “Digital Content will be deemed licensed to you by 
Amazon under this Agreement unless otherwise expressly provided by 
 
 105. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held 
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”). 
 106. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[A bank] depositor takes the risk, in 
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government. This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, 
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that . . . the confidence placed in the third party 
will not be betrayed.” (citation omitted)). 
 107. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (stating that everyone who uses a phone knows that they “‘convey’ 
phone numbers to the telephone company” when they dial them, and finding there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in these dialed numbers). 
 108. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Arlidge, supra note 48 (explaining how customers turn to services from Google or Apple 
to upload, store, and access documents). Indeed, some commentators appear to have assumed that the 
third-party doctrine would likely allow the government to obtain information stored in the cloud 
without the need for a warrant. See, e.g., Jane Horvath, Cloud Computing Issues, in Eleventh 
Annual Institute on Privacy and Data Security Law 263, 265 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 22883, 2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court[,] in 
[United States v. Miller], set a precedent that may affect the protection of data in the Cloud.”); 
Robison, supra note 45, at 1226 (“Computer networks necessarily involve a third-party service 
provider . . . .”). 
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Amazon.”111 Likewise, one’s virtual world activities can occur only 
because they are “rendered” by the powerful servers of the company 
offering such a simulated existence. Second Life, for example, is 
constantly created and recreated by the company, Linden Lab. And, as 
Josh Fairfield warns, virtual world operators receive and feel bound to 
“comply with government requests for call details, wiretaps, stored 
chatlogs, and other business records,” which may include records of the 
activities occurring in one’s virtual house.112 And the third-party doctrine 
may leave us powerless to raise an effective constitutional challenge. 
The third-party doctrine, however, does not automatically open to 
government monitoring all the information we make available to another 
party. In the first place, when the Supreme Court denied that a bank’s 
disclosure of individual records constituted a Fourth Amendment search, 
it took pains to stress that these records were “not [the] respondent’s 
‘private papers.’”113 Many of the documents a person stores in the cloud 
do consist of such private papers.114 And one’s personal library is often 
regarded as possessing the same privacy, even where it consists of books 
written by others. Moreover, the third-party doctrine has also been 
limited, in certain circumstances, where one rents or leases personal 
space from another party. Consider the example of a house or apartment 
that is rented, rather than owned. In most circumstances, it is not merely 
the person living in the house or apartment, but also the landlord who 
has a key. Yet, as Jonathan Zittrain points out, the Court found in 1961, 
even before the Katz decision, that “a police search of a rented house for 
a whiskey still was a violation of the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of 
the tenant, even though the landlord had given permission for the search. 
Information stored in the cloud deserves similar safeguards.”115 More 
specifically, there is a distinction in third-party doctrine between third-
party intermediaries who we trust to regularly access or manage 
information, as we trust banks to oversee our accounts, and other third-
party intermediaries, like a landlord, who merely provide us a space for 
us to manage our own affairs.116 As David Couillard writes, the 
 
 111. See Kindle License Agreement, Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/ 
display.html?nodeId=200144530 (select hyperlink “Digital Content”) (last updated Feb. 9, 2009); see 
also Michael Seringhaus, Note, E-Book Transactions: Amazon ‘Kindles’ the Copy Ownership Debate, 
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 147, 149 (2009) (noting that Amazon’s license terms “prevent buyers from 
actually owning books” and analyzing whether courts might nonetheless construe the contract 
between Amazon and the book purchasers as a sale). 
 112.  Fairfield, supra note 76, at 132. 
 113.  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
622 (1886)). 
 114. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
 115. Jonathan Zittrain, Op-Ed., Lost in the Cloud, N.Y. Times, July 20, 2009, at A19 (citing 
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961)). 
 116. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (“[D]ocuments . . . including financial statements and deposit 
slips . . . contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in 
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companies that give us electronic space in the cloud are more like the 
latter:  
[T]he service provider has a copy of the keys to a user’s cloud “storage 
unit,” much like a landlord or storage locker owner has keys to a 
tenant’s space, a bank has the keys to a safe deposit box, and a postal 
carrier has the keys to a mailbox. Yet that does not give law 
enforcement the authority to use those third parties as a means to 
enter a private space.117  
Courts would likely analyze each space on its own terms, so one 
cannot assume that eReaders and virtual world homes will be treated in 
the same way as are storage spaces in the cloud. But there are plausible 
Fourth Amendment arguments for protecting each of these spaces on the 
grounds that, for each, the third-party intermediary is providing the 
space—and perhaps, in the case of eReaders, a stockpile from which to 
obtain content for that space—but is not managing a person’s choices or 
informational activities in that space. 
We find another, similar basis for shielding the details of our virtual 
activities in Orin Kerr’s recently proposed framework for applying 
Fourth Amendment law to the Internet.118 Cyberspace, he argues, forces 
courts to recreate—in virtual environments—the distinction they have 
traditionally drawn in the brick-and-mortar world between enclosed 
spaces, such as the home, or a purse, or an envelope, that we use to wall 
off and shield our private activities, and the open spaces that we share 
with and that can be seen by others.119 In Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, our acts in confidential “inside” environments are 
generally constitutionally shielded from officials, whereas our acts in 
“outside” areas can be freely observed.120 This distinction between inside 
 
the ordinary course of business.”); Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 470 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[The 
third party doctrine] does not necessarily apply . . . to an intermediary that merely has the ability to 
access the information sought by the government. Otherwise phone conversations would never be 
protected, merely because the telephone company can access them; . . . storage lockers would never be 
protected, by virtue of the . . . storage company’s ability to access them.”), vacated on other grounds by 
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Com v. Weis, 348 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Mass. 1976) (“[T]he authority 
of [an] attendant, if any, to search on behalf of his employer d[oes] not give him power to authorize a 
police search.”). 
 117. See Couillard, supra note 94, 2237–38. One might argue that this is not the case when a 
company providing storage space or access to a particular application on the cloud expressly reserves 
the right to access the content of users’ communications, documents, or other files. As Robison notes, 
such provisions, allowing third-party companies to access content that can then be used to provide 
users with targeted advertising, are not uncommon. See Robison, supra note 45, at 1213 (“Many cloud 
providers rely extensively on advertising revenue [and use c]ontextual[ized] advertising [that] requires 
access to content.”). 
 118. Kerr, supra note 83. 
 119. Id. at 1007 (“[C]ourts should try to apply the Fourth Amendment in the new environment in 
ways that roughly replicate the role of the Fourth Amendment in the traditional physical setting.”). 
 120. Id. at 1010–12 (“[T]he police are permitted to access anything exposed to the general 
public. . . . On the other hand, entering enclosed spaces ordinarily constitutes a search that triggers the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
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and outside, however, has little significance in cyberspace.121 Thus, Kerr 
proposes that courts rely, in Internet cases, on a functionally equivalent 
distinction between the type of information that people would generally 
choose to keep in a private, inside environment when disseminated in the 
physical world (content information) and the type of information that 
they would probably leave open to observation (non-content 
information, such as the address and routing information on the front of 
an envelope).122 As Kerr notes, “the content/non-content distinction 
captures the basic function of the inside/outside distinction.”123 Whether 
the Fourth Amendment is protecting one’s sanctuaries in physical 
space—for example, one’s house, briefcase, or purse—or the content of 
one’s files and communication in cyberspace, it is, in both cases, keeping 
the State from helping itself to “the contents of the person’s mind that he 
normally keeps to himself or only shares with a trusted few.”124 Such 
Fourth Amendment protection for “the contents of [one’s] mind” would 
almost certainly cover the electronic documents we compose, the e-
books we read, and the videos we privately watch. 
This is not to say that there is no room for skepticism or uncertainty 
here.125 My point is not that Fourth Amendment protection is certain in 
each of these spaces, but that it would be an entirely plausible extension 
of existing Fourth Amendment law. By contrast, the option of extending 
Stanley to the cloud or to virtual world homes seems entirely foreclosed 
by multiple courts’ refusal to extend it to interactive computer services 
that involve the Internet.126 
Given courts’ persistent refusal to extend Stanley’s holding to any 
space that has even slight contact with public spaces or channels of 
communications,127 it is quite likely that reading and video-watching in 
virtual environments would be far less protected than the reading we do 
in a physical home. But why? People do not have to revert to primitive, 
low-tech, and entirely in-home forms of communication or cultural 
exploration to avoid unfettered monitoring. Fourth Amendment 
protections against warrantless wiretapping now extend to phone lines 
and broadband connections. Why, then, should individuals have to 
confine themselves to increasingly outmoded technologies, disconnected 
from the information superhighway, to benefit fully from the protection 
that the Constitution offers for freedom of thought? Why should the 
 
 121. Id. at 1012 (“[On the] Internet, the inside/outside distinction no longer works.”). 
 122. Id. at 1017–18. 
 123. Id. at 1018. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., supra notes 110, 117 (citing authors who believe that, under the third-party doctrine, 
government access to data stored in the cloud would not likely count as a Fourth Amendment search). 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20. 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20. 
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same low value speech that is protected in an old book or an eight-
millimeter film be unprotected when it is read in a digitally downloaded 
eBook or video, stored or accessed in virtual space? The next Part 
examines some possible answers to this question, and concludes that 
none of them are persuasive. 
II.  Redrawing First Amendment Boundary Lines: Why the 
Private-Public Distinction Should Not Define the Borders of 
STANLEY V. GEORGIA 
Perhaps the most likely starting point for explaining why there is a 
difference in the scope of Katz’s Fourth Amendment protection and 
Stanley’s First Amendment protection is the difference in what “privacy” 
each safeguard protects. Both can be described as protecting the privacy 
that individuals find in the home (and in Fourth Amendment law, in 
other private environments)—but they each protect privacy in a different 
sense of the word. The Fourth Amendment largely protects information 
privacy: It protects the individual against observation, monitoring, and 
surveillance. As Fred Cate notes, the Fourth Amendment is “the primary 
constitutional limit on the government’s ability to obtain personal 
information about individuals.”128 It does so by “plac[ing] obstacles in the 
way of a too permeating police surveillance.”129 Its protection of the 
home, for example, is first and foremost a protection against unfettered 
government gathering of “information regarding the interior of the 
home.”130 It keeps the home “safe from prying government eyes.”131 By 
contrast, the State’s constitutional violation in Stanley was not that it 
observed or watched something it was forbidden to search for without a 
warrant.132 The police did, to be sure, find the obscene movie Stanley 
possessed during a search of his house—but that search occurred only 
after they had acquired a warrant from a neutral magistrate based upon 
probable cause that Stanley was involved in illegal bookmaking 
activities.133 The State did, however, impermissibly infringe Stanley’s 
privacy in another sense of the word: by limiting his decisional privacy.134 
As the Court declared, it is for each individual to determine how to 
“satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own 
 
 128.  Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 435, 451 (2008). 
 129. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). 
 130. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (emphasis added). 
 131. Id. at 37. 
 132. See 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). 
 133. Id. at 558. 
 134. See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 
1149, 1208 (2005) (“[T]he general term ‘privacy’ encompasses three separate ‘clusters.’ ‘Substantive’ or 
‘decisional’ privacy is the constitutional right to make certain fundamental decisions free from 
government scrutiny or interference.”). 
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home.”135 The constitutional violation in Stanley occurred not because the 
State impermissibly monitored Stanley as he read or watched movies, but 
because it actively thwarted and punished certain decisions Stanley made 
about which books to read or which films to watch.136 
This difference suggests one hypothesis for why the reach of Stanley 
might be more limited than that of Fourth Amendment privacy 
protection: Our right to almost unfettered control over the shape and 
content of our own living environment, one might argue, can only reach 
the extreme form it took in Stanley in an environment that belongs 
wholly to the individual, or group of individuals, who claims this nearly 
complete sovereignty of cultural choice. When that individual moves, 
even slightly, into the shared public space one finds over the phone wires, 
on the Internet, or in the physical public square, her degree of control is 
necessarily lessened so that her interests may be reconciled (usually with 
some government coordination) with those of others who share the 
environment. In short, once she leaves the castle that is her home, her 
right to control her surroundings and to make her own decisions must 
now leave some room for the assertion of community values that have no 
place in a purely solitary environment. By contrast, the Fourth 
Amendment’s information privacy protections are more portable and are 
better able to coexist with social interaction and to harmonize different 
interests. Indeed, they exist to shield not only the individual’s own 
decisions about how to shape her personal environment, but also her 
numerous communications with others.137 
There is, however, a problem with this explanation: Even if Stanley’s 
right of decisional privacy to engage in certain forms of expression or 
intellectual exploration is and must be more limited in scope that Fourth 
Amendment rights of information privacy, this does not clearly explain 
why it must be limited to one’s brick-and-mortar home. Even if Stanley’s 
right to uncensored thinking, reading, and viewing must be scaled back in 
environments we share with the community, that does not mean it should 
also be weakened in other, more private enclaves within public space. If 
Stanley is meant to protect our solitary cultural explorations, then it 
should protect not only a person’s in-home reading or film-viewing, but 
also the environments where she stores information, entirely for her own 
reading and viewing, within the cloud.138 Or a virtual home or apartment 
 
 135. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. 
 136. This is why the Court emphasized in Stanley that the First Amendment “means that [the] 
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what 
films he may watch.” Id. Its concern was not just about State attempts to watch our behavior, but 
about State efforts to control our behavior. Id. 
 137. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59, 62–63 (1967); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
662–63 (1979) (holding unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment a program of stopping and 
checking certain drivers without reasonable suspicion). 
 138. See supra Part I.A–B. 
Blitz_62-HLJ-357.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/13/2011 10:38 AM 
382 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:357 
accessible only to herself (and the Internet Service Provider that plays 
the role of virtual landlord).139 Or a stream of data that travels—in the 
form of electrons—through public wires, but takes the form of an 
obscene text, image, or movie only once it reaches an in-home 
computer.140 
What then are the possible explanations for why Stanley’s First 
Amendment protection is so much more confined than Katz’s Fourth 
Amendment protection, and why, unlike the latter, it provides no 
protection to virtual spaces or electronic channels of communication? I 
will here consider the two most plausible ones: (1) the “character of the 
public environment” argument, which contends that extending Stanley’s 
freedom-of-thought protection to public space is at odds with the State’s 
obligation to protect public culture or to avoid supporting activities in 
public space that are at odds with communal morality; and (2) the 
“unique status of the home” argument, which emphasizes that Stanley’s 
protection is rooted in the unique status of our physical homes and—for 
reasons of logic, social convention, or both—cannot be applied to other 
environments that lack the home’s long-established historical role as a 
haven from external observation and control. These arguments are not 
mutually exclusive, but it is helpful to analyze each separately, since they 
can each stand on their own. 
A. STANLEY and the Character of the Public Environment 
 As noted above, one key argument against extending Stanley is that 
it would tie the government’s hands in certain realms of public life that 
the government must be free to regulate in order to preserve public 
safety or otherwise to serve the public interest. This is the most plausible 
logic for Chief Justice Burger’s claim, in United States v. Orito141 and 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,142 that there is no “‘zone’ of ‘privacy’ that 
follows a distributor or a consumer of obscene materials wherever he 
goes.”143 But where, precisely, is the harm or legal error in recognizing 
such a zone? 
First, one possible reason that First Amendment privacy rights are 
more strictly confined to the home than are Fourth Amendment privacy 
rights lies in the textual differences between these amendments. The 
 
 139. See supra Part I.C. 
 140. See Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1233, 1251 (2007) (“[M]essages 
are broken up into small packets of data, which are transferred independently by each router they 
encounter along the way, and then reassembled.”). 
 141. 413 U.S. 139, 142–43 (1973). 
 142. 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973) (“[W]e have declined to equate the privacy of the home relied on in 
Stanley with a ‘zone’ of ‘privacy’ that follows a distributor or a consumer of obscene materials 
wherever he goes.”). 
 143. Id. 
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Fourth Amendment’s terms do not bar unreasonable monitoring only of 
a person’s “house[],” but also of her “person[], . . . papers and effects.”144 
It would be difficult, given this constitutional language, to evict the 
Fourth Amendment from public spaces when such spaces are the 
territory into which people bring themselves, their papers, and their 
effects. By contrast, the First Amendment contains no such restriction. 
But neither does it limit “freedom of speech” nor any of its corollaries to 
the home.145 Indeed, when an individual leaves her home and ventures 
into public space, she takes with her the mental powers of perception, 
thought, and imagination that Stanley was meant to protect. The logic of 
Stanley seems to apply just as forcefully to private thought in public 
space, as well as to private speech or cultural exploration in cyberspace. 
This specific language of the Bill of Rights therefore, does not, by itself, 
provide an answer to why First Amendment privacy should have a 
narrower scope than that of the Fourth Amendment. 
A second explanation lies in the commercial character of the 
Internet and of other channels for electronic data. The Supreme Court 
first began limiting Stanley even before internet communications were 
widespread, by emphasizing the government’s power to regulate 
commercial activity. This was a central theme in Justice White’s majority 
opinion in United States v. Reidel.146 It distinguished Stanley’s viewing of 
pornographic films from Reidel’s commercial trade in pornography, 
noting that “[w]hatever the scope of the ‘right to receive’ referred to in 
Stanley, it is not so broad as to” establish a “right to do business in 
obscenity and use the mails in the process.”147 Chief Justice Burger then 
repeated this theme in United States v. Orito,148 United States v. 12 200-ft. 
Reels of Super 8mm. Film,149 and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.150 But 
the Chief Justice also expressly stated something that had been, at most, 
merely hinted at in White’s earlier opinions. He explained that Stanley’s 
freedom-of-thought protection was inapplicable not only to commercial 
activity in the public sphere, but to all activity in the public sphere, even 
 
 144. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 145. U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right to the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances.”). 
 146. 402 U.S. 351 (1971). 
 147. Id. at 355, 356. 
 148. 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (“[V]iewing obscene films in a commercial theater open to the adult 
public or transporting such films in common carriers in interstate commerce, has no claim to such 
special consideration.” (citation omitted)). 
 149. 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973) (upholding the seizure of pornography in an airline storage area, in 
part, by emphasizing Congress’s broad power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” (citing 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 150. 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (“[T]here are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of 
commercialized obscenity . . . .”). 
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activity seen and heard only by willing viewers and listeners.151 As noted 
earlier, he stated that the constitutional zone of privacy protection 
remains fixed to the home and does not follow the individual anywhere 
outside of it.152 He was not entirely clear about the justification for this 
additional narrowing of Stanley, but the Supreme Court and other courts 
have suggested elsewhere that it is because all activity outside the home, 
and the wire lines that lead into it, are too closely connected to 
commerce to be treated as “private.”153 
This further narrowing of Stanley’s scope requires some explaining. 
Consider the following three variations on Stanley’s facts—the first two 
of which I have already touched upon: 
(1) A modern-day Stanley does not simply possess an obscene film in 
his own home, he stores it in a private space he has reserved for his use 
within the “cloud,” in order to watch it over the Internet. 
(2) A modern-day Stanley reads an obscene book rather than viewing 
an obscene film, and reads it on an eReader after having it wirelessly 
delivered to his eReader by a hypothetical seller of digital books (some 
of which are pornographic). The state not only penalizes the 
bookseller, but orders it to remotely delete the book it illegally sold to 
Stanley. 
(3) A modern-day Stanley does not simply possess the obscene film in 
his own home; he receives it on a DVD sent by a friend, free of charge, 
and watches it on a television set or computer. 
 It is hard to see why Reidel’s holding, allowing the State to target 
and restrict “business in obscenity,” justifies any restriction of Stanley’s 
behavior in the first two examples or that of his friend in the third. In the 
first example, Stanley’s behavior is virtually identical to that in the actual 
1969 case—but is updated to include the use of modern technology: He is 
watching a film that he has stored in his own personal space, for his own 
personal use, and is watching it in an entirely private environment such 
that the outside world cannot see it unless he allows them to do so. One 
might argue that the modern-day variant is commercial in nature, 
because Stanley is able to store the film on a third-party server and watch 
 
 151. See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 153. See, e.g., Orito, 413 U.S. at 142–43 (“The Constitution extends special safeguards to the 
privacy of the home . . . . [V]iewing obscene films in a commercial theater open to the adult 
public . . . has no claim to such special consideration. . . . [T]he Government has a legitimate interest in 
protecting the public commercial environment by preventing such material from entering the stream of 
commerce.” (emphases added) (citations omitted) (citing Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 57)); see 
also United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Orito and Paris Adult 
Theatre affirm the power of the government to ‘regulate interstate commerce to the extent of 
forbidding the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality . . . .’ The Internet is a 
channel of commerce covered by the federal statutes regulating the distribution of obscenity.” 
(quoting Orito, 413 U.S. at 144 n.6)). 
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it over the Internet only pursuant to a contractual arrangement he enters 
into with the company operating that server. But why is that any more 
commercial than keeping an obscene book or DVD in a leased desk or in 
another piece of rented furniture in one’s study? The same question 
might be raised about the second example. When a person receives a 
physical book that she did not write herself, she doubtlessly received it 
from somewhere in the outside world. The fact that the book was 
obtained in a commercial transaction does not make the subsequent 
reading of the books a commercial act. Why then would reading an 
eBook be a commercial act? 
The third example differs from the first two in that it is no longer 
solely Stanley himself who is a knowing participant in possessing and 
watching the obscene film: Also involved is a friend who serves as the 
source of the obscene material. But it would be odd to define 
“commercial” as covering any presentation of any item by one person to 
another. It would, for example, be at odds with the Supreme Court’s 
existing definition of “commercial speech”—which generally receives 
less protection than most other protected speech—to say that any time 
one person gives another a book, music CD, or video, she is engaged in 
commercial expression. Rather, commercial expression is usually 
understood by the Court to be first and foremost “speech which does ‘no 
more than propose a commercial transaction.’”154 A simple gift from one 
person to another is not a commercial transaction and does not propose 
such a transaction. The Court’s decision in Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp.155 emphasized that while the proposal of commercial 
transaction is perhaps the most important factor in determining whether 
speech is commercial speech,156 there are also two others: (1) whether the 
speech refers to a “specific product,” and (2) whether the speaker “has 
an economic motivation” for the speech.157 Again, it is hard to see how 
either of these factors weigh in favor of characterizing an obscene text or 
movie as “commercial speech” when it is not intended to get the 
individual to buy a particular product or even to buy anything at all. 
Admittedly, the definition of “commerce” is broader in other parts 
of constitutional law, most notably the jurisprudence of the Commerce 
Clause.158 Under the Court’s 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn, for 
example, even the act of growing food on one’s own farm for one’s own 
consumption can count as commerce, because of its effect on the 
 
 154. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 
(1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 
(1973)). 
 155. 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983). 
 156. Id. at 66 (referring to this factor as providing the “core notion of commercial speech”). 
 157. Id. at 66–67. 
 158. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
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market.159 The Court drew heavily upon similar reasoning when it held 
that commerce subject to federal government regulation included even 
the wholly in-state cultivation of medical marijuana.160 As long as such 
activity might substantially impact commerce in the aggregate, it could be 
subject to regulation under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.161 
However, applying such a broad definition proves too much. Far from 
explaining the distinction between the in-home film viewing in Stanley 
and the pornography commerce addressed in Reidel, it would abolish the 
distinction altogether—since even Stanley’s desire to view obscenity in 
his own home would affect the market for obscenity. 
Nor can one save the confining boundary placed around Stanley by 
arguing that even ostensibly non-commercial expression conveyed 
through the Internet becomes subject to regulation when the signals that 
constitute it travel through a “channel of commerce,”162 such as phone 
lines. The problem, again, is that the eight-millimeter film Stanley viewed 
also made its way to his house, in part, through a similar channel, most 
likely the roads or other physical transportation paths. The implausibility 
of trying to place principled limits on Stanley by holding it inapplicable to 
all channels of commerce is illustrated by an unusual case in 2008 that 
found Stanley inapplicable to a person’s in-home viewing of obscene 
imagery on the grounds that the imagery “was produced using materials 
that traveled in interstate commerce.”163 The question begged by this 
holding is how to distinguish Stanley itself, since the film in Stanley’s 
possession was also unquestionably “produced using materials that 
traveled in interstate commerce,” namely, the cameras used to create 
those films and the celluloid on which the films were printed. 
Thus, one cannot justify banishing Stanley’s freedom-of-thought 
principle from the public sphere simply by defining the whole of that 
sphere as a realm of commercial activity. There is a substantial amount of 
private and personal activity, much of it non-commercial, that occurs 
outside the home.164 What then are the other plausible arguments for 
treating the public sphere as wholly beyond Stanley’s reach? 
 
 159. 317 U.S. 111, 118, 127 (1942). 
 160. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005) (“The similarities between this case and Wickard are 
striking. Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible 
commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market.”). 
 161. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–28 (“That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may 
be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his 
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”). 
 162. See, e.g., United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating that the First 
Amendment protection described in Stanley v. Georgia does not place limits on laws concerning “the 
movement of obscene material in channels of commerce”). 
 163. United States v. Mees, No. 4:09CR00145 ERW, 2009 WL 1657420, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 10, 
2009). 
 164. It would be odd, for example, to say that individuals are engaged in the “business in 
obscenity,” or the commercial distribution or display of obscenity, when they describe an allegedly 
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One, perhaps, might be found in Chief Justice Burger’s statement in 
Paris Adult Theatre I that the government must be empowered to restrict 
obscenity in the public sphere, not merely to protect “the tone of 
commerce in the great city centers,” but also to protect “the interest of 
the public in the quality of life and the total community 
environment . . . .”165 But it is hard to see why a concern for “the quality 
of life and total community environment” would justify restricting 
private web surfing, or borrowing or accepting a DVD from a friend. 
Such private cultural activities have little more impact—by themselves—
on the total community environment than does a single person’s viewing 
of a video on her own TV set and DVD player.166 Moreover, it is not 
clear how the government’s interest in the “total community 
environment” could ever warrant restricting the speech or thoughts of an 
individual member of that community—unless it drew on precisely the 
kind of aggregation principle that was used in Wickard v. Filburn,167 but 
this is foreign to First Amendment jurisprudence. The First Amendment, 
for example, does not classify speech itself as “inciting” because the 
speech is one small component of a large set of acts that together 
constitute incitement.168 Nor does it classify speech as “commercial” 
because its effect is commercial only when considered in conjunction 
with numerous other instances of speech.169 In short, such an attempt to 
hold Stanley inapplicable to the public wire lines based on its alleged 
effects confronts the same question that Justice Black first raised in his 
dissent in United States v. Reidel: “The mere act of importation for 
private use can hardly be more offensive to others than is private perusal 
in one’s home.”170 
Another possibility lies in the sense that, however free people might 
be to introduce obscenity into their own thoughts, they should not be 
free to introduce it into the channels of communication that are shared 
with, and sustained by, the public. But the First Amendment public 
forum doctrine—which, among other things, prevents the government 
from restricting speech on the basis of content in parks and streets171—
 
obscene thought to their psychotherapists, sketch an allegedly obscene picture in a private diary while 
riding on a bus, or e-mail an allegedly obscene story to a friend. 
 165. 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973). 
 166. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 159–61. 
 168. On the contrary, the particular speech act that the State wishes to restrict as incitement must 
be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and [be] likely to incite or produce such 
action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 155–57 (listing factors the Court uses to determine 
whether an instance of speech constitutes commercial speech). 
 170. United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 381 & n.* (1971) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (providing a joint dissent for Riedel and Thirty-Seven Photographs). 
 171. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“In places[, 
including streets and parks,] which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to 
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requires the government to protect speech that is not only unpopular, but 
that expressly challenges constitutional principles. The government may 
not, for example, deny neo-Nazis the right to march in a street or rally at 
a park.172 Even certain low-value speech, such as outdoor advertisements 
for cigarettes, is insulated against government restriction.173 The speech 
that travels through internet cables and inside of sealed envelopes is, if 
anything, likely to be much less of an emotional burden on those who 
find it objectionable, since, unlike the speech in streets and parks, it will 
likely remain entirely invisible and inaudible to them. In fact, the data 
packets that travel through the Internet have little meaning to anyone in 
between the point of transmission and reception unless that person goes 
to the effort to intercept and to reassemble all of them into the image or 
text they carry. It is true that some members of the public might be 
offended simply by the knowledge that government-supported channels 
of communication are carrying such material, even if it never reaches 
their eyes and ears.174 But the same people may be equally offended by 
their awareness of the other resources that allow the Stanleys of the 
country to view obscenity: the police and security, neighborhood 
maintenance, and building code requirements, for example, that help 
Stanley watch and enjoy his preferred films in his own home. Or the 
protections the State offers to the development and sale of the TV and 
DVD technology that allow Stanley to watch obscenity in his home. It is 
a mistake, in other words, to assume that the original film viewing in 
Stanley happened without the same kind of state and societal framework 
that is necessary to sustain and nourish technologies of communication 
or of transport. 
One other possible means of justifying the distinction that the Court 
has drawn between private and public life in applying Stanley is to 
redefine it: It is not, one might argue, first and foremost about the line 
between the intimate life of the home and the social environment outside 
of it, but rather the line between those activities that involve only a 
solitary actor and those that involve contacts with others. What 
distinguishes Reidel, or the protagonists of Whorley,175 from Stanley, 
perhaps, is that they were not merely producing or in possession of 
 
assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”). 
 172. See Village of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ill. 1978) (“The 
display of the swastika, as offensive to the principles of a free nation as the memories it recalls may be, 
is symbolic political speech intended to convey to the public the beliefs of those who display it.”). 
 173. See Lorrilard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561–66 (striking down such limitations on 
cigarette advertising as unconstitutionally limiting). 
 174. See Steven D. Smith, Is the Harm Principle Illiberal?, 51 Am. J. Juris. 1, 16 (2006) (“[Y]ou 
(the viewer of XXX movies) cannot plausibly deny that some citizens do feel emotional distress 
because of what you are doing: indeed, it may be obvious that they are deeply unhappy about your 
movie-watching predilections.”). 
 175. See United States v. Whorley, 569 F.3d 211, 212 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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obscenity for their own viewing, but rather were attempting to send it to 
others. They were, in other words, disseminating it out into the world, 
rather than keeping it to themselves—and it is this attempt to spread 
obscene speech that makes it a public concern in the way that Stanley’s 
original viewing was not. 
One might analogize this to that which helps to define the contours 
of another form of problematic speech: defamation. One becomes liable 
for defamation not merely by viewing or listening to false speech, but by 
making that speech to others under conditions in which one knows, or 
should know, of its false or defamatory nature.176 One is not guilty of 
defamation merely by listening to it.177 The same is true of incitement: It 
is the inciter, not his target audience, who is subject to prosecution for 
trying to foment violence.178 One might draw the same distinction here: A 
person who merely views pornography in his home or on his computer 
terminal is protected by Stanley’s right to receive information and ideas. 
The person or entity who knowingly delivers it to him is not. 
There is, however, an important weakness in this analogy. An 
audience member who merely hears defamation or incitement is simply a 
passive recipient of such information and may not believe in or act upon 
it. By contrast, the person who orders obscene speech through the mail 
or downloads it from the Internet is a more active participant and is 
likely to be aware of its obscene nature when doing so. They are, in a 
sense, not merely viewing it, but cooperating with the sender to provide 
it to themselves. Moreover, they act as their own providers in this sense, 
even when there is no identifiable sender. When Stanley goes to the shelf 
where he stored an obscene film and then places it in a projector he has 
purchased, he provides his own means of viewing the film.179 When he 
goes to his personal storage space in the cloud and downloads an obscene 
video he previously uploaded there, he is, again, serving as his own 
provider. Why then should the State be allowed to punish a provider of 
obscene speech only when it is a person other than the viewer or listener 
himself? One might suggest that it is generally more permissible for the 
government to prevent harm inflicted by one person upon another than 
to prevent a person’s harm to herself. This argument is weak where a 
 
 176. Thus, the elements of defamation include “a false and defamatory statement concerning 
another” and “an unprivileged publication [of that statement] to a third party.” Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 558 (1977). 
 177. Id. (listing no element that embraces receipt of the communication). 
 178. As noted above, speech is punishable only if the speech is “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 447 (1969). 
 179. Indeed, some of the cases held Stanley inapplicable by implausibly extending the kind of 
speech-delivery that is counted as “commercial” and permitted the State to punish individuals who 
were carrying materials only for their own private viewing. See, e.g., United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of 
Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973). 
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person inflicts such “harm” according to another’s wishes, instead of 
against them. If the government cannot paternalistically restrict whatever 
harm flows from obscenity when a person imposes it on herself without 
help, it is not clear why it should be able to impose such restriction when 
help is available and only with respect to the helper, instead of the 
person helped to obtain obscene speech.180 
In short, there are no characteristics of public space that mark it out 
as wholly inappropriate for the freedom-of-thought protection identified 
in Stanley. Going forward, one option for courts is to go back to the turn 
in the road taken by the Court in Reidel and to rethink precisely how its 
limitation of Stanley should be understood. In the first place, we might 
note that the Court in Reidel did not evict Stanley’s protection from all 
corners of public space or channels of information, but simply from those 
that carried and enabled the “business in obscenity.”181 Where use of an 
e-mail service or interactive computer service does not involve any such 
business, it should not automatically be denied Stanley’s freedom-of-
thought protection simply on the basis that it occurs in channels of 
communication that are also, at times, channels of commerce. 
Reidel also differentiated Stanley by noting that it dealt with 
possession and individual perception of obscene materials, whereas 
Reidel’s sending of such materials was “distribution.”182 This distinction, 
however, only makes sense under circumstances where it is possible to 
distinguish the acts that constitute possession and perception from those 
that constitute distribution. Where the act of distribution merges into the 
activity of possessing a text, image, or video—as it does in use of the 
cloud to access stored materials or use of an eReader—Stanley should 
not cease to protect the possession and perception that takes place.183 
This leaves us with an alternative vision of how Stanley should apply 
in the twenty-first century, one quite different from the widely espoused 
notion that it is without force in any circumstances other than its original, 
increasingly archaic, setting. Stanley should apply not only to the brick-
and-mortar environment that used to define the boundaries of home life. 
It should also apply to those of our interactions with the contemporary 
 
 180. Whorley, 569 F.3d at 214 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Stanley should protect the 
sender of non-commercial e-mails with obscene text where there is no harm caused). 
 181. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354–57 (1971). 
 182. Id. at 356. 
 183. Osborne v. Ohio and subsequent cases analyzing possession of child pornography limited 
Stanley’s reach in a manner entirely unrelated to whether the material is viewed inside or outside the 
home, whether it is commercial or non-commercial, or whether it is possessed or distributed. Even 
purely private in-home possession of child pornography is made possible only by harming the child 
who has been exploited (and whose dignity and mental well-being might suffer further damage from 
distribution of the obscene materials). Osborne, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (“[T]he materials produced 
by child pornographers permanently record the victim’s abuse. The pornography’s continued existence 
causes the child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come.”). 
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public environment that are functionally equivalent to our in-home lives 
insofar as they involve (1) private access to and viewing of materials, 
rather than wide distribution of them, and (2) like the home, have a 
primarily non-commercial nature. As long as obscenity or other low-
value speech has such features and also lacks the harm-threatening 
characteristics of child pornography or other speech likely to cause 
significant damage to third parties, it should be safeguarded against state 
restriction. 
Still, there are some who may hesitate to accept this narrower vision 
of Stanley without considering another possible basis for limiting Stanley 
to home life, traditionally understood. Thus, the next subpart turns from 
asking what is special about public space (where Stanley’s freedom of 
thought is allegedly unsuitable) to asking what is special about the 
physical space of the home that might (as the Court has insisted) make it 
the only environment where Stanley’s protection can have any force. 
B. STANLEY and the Uniqueness of the Home 
I have assumed thus far that even if one objects to extending 
Stanley’s freedom-of-thought protection to cover our public activities, 
one can at least imagine how such an extension might work. After all, it 
is not merely in the home, but also in public space that we engage in 
intellectual exploration and private reflection about the things we see 
and hear. If Stanley is meant to protect our ability to perceive the world 
free of blinders, and to deliberate about it free from external 
interference, why wouldn’t its protections be able to follow those 
activities out of the home and into public space? 
But this question, one might object, fundamentally misunderstands 
the holding of Stanley. The home, some might argue, was not merely one 
site that a person might, as the Court put it, “satisfy his intellectual and 
emotional needs”184 almost entirely insulated from government control; it 
was an inseparable part of the freedom that Stanley was identifying. The 
Court after all, did not simply give people a right to “satisfy his 
intellectual or emotional needs,” but rather a “right to satisfy [them] in 
the privacy of [their] own home[s].”185 If that is right, then the problem 
with attempting to carry freedom of thought beyond the walls of the 
home is not merely that it is inappropriate or harmful beyond those 
walls, but that it cannot, by definition, extend beyond them, because it is 
no longer the same liberty. 
Why, then, might Stanley be inextricably linked to the home in this 
way, when our mental activity and powers of perception are not so 
confined? One possible answer has to do with the nature of the home. 
 
 184. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
 185. Id. (emphasis added). 
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There is, one might claim, something about the home, and the role it 
plays in our lives, that makes it an irreplaceable sanctuary for this 
particular kind of freedom. One might argue, for example, that the home 
attained its status as a place to hide from the outside world, in large part 
because of its nature as a place where our ownership gives us a greater 
degree of control over the environment than anywhere else. As Friedrich 
Hayek has argued, “[f]reedom . . . presupposes that the individual has 
some assured private sphere, that there is some set of circumstances in 
his environment with which others cannot interfere.”186 In Hayek’s view, 
it is in large part individual property rights that define this sphere: Our 
property rights in the space of the home help to carve out a piece of the 
environment where our decisionmaking power is subject to minimal state 
interference.187 The same vision of the home, as the deepest and most 
insulated retreat from the external world, plays an important role in 
Fourth Amendment law where, as Justice Scalia noted in Kyllo, “[i]n the 
home . . . all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held 
safe from prying government eyes.”188 
This view provides the basis for a possible response to my central 
question as to why the scope of the First Amendment privacy protections 
is so much narrower than is the scope of the Fourth Amendment privacy 
protection recognized in Katz v. United States. Katz, one might argue, 
provides the wrong Fourth Amendment analogy, because it protects 
against warrantless monitoring information on phone lines that might 
well be innocent—or even valuable—conversation, information of a sort 
that the government has no business spying on.189 By contrast, the 
obscene film at issue in Stanley has no such value: It is, by definition, 
information that the government can bar or restrict, and—much like a 
wanted criminal who has found sanctuary in a foreign embassy—is saved 
from state regulation not because of what it is, but only because of where 
it is. If that is so, then the correct Fourth Amendment analogy is 
provided not by Katz, but by a combination of the Court’s decisions in 
United States v. Place190 and Kyllo v. United States.191 In Place, the Court 
made clear that when a government search technique—in that case, a 
police dog trained to alert only to drugs192—“discloses only the presence 
 
 186. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 13 (Phoenix ed. 1978). 
 187. Id. at 140 (emphasizing how a “protected sphere” for individual action is established in part 
through “recognition of private property”). 
 188. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). 
 189. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“[T]he public telephone has come to play [a vital role] in private 
communication.”); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56–60 (1967) (discussing that 
eavesdropping in criminal investigations is necessarily “broad in scope,” because it indiscriminately 
records all of a conversation and not simply those parts relevant to criminal activity).  
 190. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
 191. 533 U.S. 27. 
 192. 462 U.S. at 697–98. 
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or absence of . . . a contraband item” then there can be no threat to any 
Fourth Amendment privacy interests, since no one has a legitimate 
interest in hiding possession of a criminal substance.193 The same rule 
should apply in the First Amendment context, one might argue, where 
one’s contraband is informational contraband with no First Amendment 
value. However, one might add, drawing on Kyllo, that even certain 
forms of contraband that do not generate a constitutional shield by 
themselves, do stand behind such a shield in the home because, as noted 
above, “[i]n the home . . . all details are intimate details,” and “the entire 
area is held safe from prying government eyes.”194 
The Court seemed to adopt a similar interpretation of Stanley in 
United States v. Reidel. Stanley’s freedom of thought, it insisted, did not 
depend at all on the nature of the material Stanley was watching; this 
freedom did “not depend on whether the materials are obscene or 
whether obscenity is constitutionally protected.”195 Rather, his right to 
watch these (or any) materials in private was “independently saved by 
the Constitution.”196 More specifically, the First Amendment rights at 
issue in Stanley, arose from something about Stanley’s situation other 
than the film he was viewing—and that something, assumed the Court, 
had to be the intimate and private environment he was in.197 
There are, however, some puzzles in this interpretation of Stanley. It 
cannot be, after all, that everything one does in the privacy of one’s home 
is covered by the First Amendment. On the contrary, the Court in 
Stanley took pains to stress that “[w]hat we have said in no way infringes 
upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession 
of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime.”198 
Later courts have made it clear that one’s right to view even obscene 
materials free of state interference does not prevent law enforcement 
from punishing viewing of materials, like child pornography, the 
production and dissemination of which entail harm to the children 
depicted.199 But if illegal activities like possession of drugs or other 
dangerous substances are not shielded from punishment by the walls of 
the home, why is the possession of an illegally obscene film or book 
shielded? 
 
 193. Id. at 707–08. 
 194. 533 U.S. at 37. 
 195. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 355 (noting that Stanley protects people only against the government’s unwanted 
intrusion into their homes). 
 198. 394 U.S. 557, 568 n.11 (1969). 
 199. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (“The State does not rely on a paternalistic 
interest in regulating Osborne’s mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted [this law] in order to protect the 
victims of child pornography; it hopes to destroy a market for the exploitative use of children.”). 
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There must be something about the latter activity other than its 
location in the home which accounts for why it receives First 
Amendment protection denied to other acts. One possibility is that, as 
the Court proclaimed in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, even “low value” speech 
actually has some First Amendment value: “We have not said,” the 
Court made clear, that low-value speech “is in all respects worthless and 
undeserving of constitutional protection.”200 Another possibility is that 
even if Stanley’s obscene film viewing is devoid of any protectable First 
Amendment expression, it might involve the exercise of another distinct 
First Amendment freedom, namely, the freedom of thought. Because 
Stanley’s viewing of a film would—unlike selling drugs or manufacturing 
chemicals—only involve perceiving and thinking, it may be that it falls 
within the scope of freedom of thought, even if it is outside the scope of 
freedom of speech per se.201 But these suggestions raise doubts about the 
argument that the freedoms in Stanley are inextricably tied to the home: 
Once we recognize that even speech ostensibly outside the scope of the 
Free Speech Clause, such as obscenity, may well have some First 
Amendment value—either because there is some residual First 
Amendment value in all expression, or because it is an exercise of our 
freedom of thought—then the question arises as to why this value cannot 
be recognized to offer some protection outside of the home’s walls. 
In fact, while it is in the nature of the home to offer a very effective 
sanctuary for our private intellectual and cultural lives, it is not the only 
such sanctuary, and is often not even the most effective or suitable one. 
It is not the most effective, because the physical walls of the home often 
leak sound, and the windows sometimes allow glimpses from on-
lookers.202 Moreover, for those who share a home with family members 
or roommates, one’s private reading or film-viewing choices may well be 
subject to observation by others within the home environment. By 
contrast, a password-protected space in the cloud on the Web might be 
far more closed off to the world, at least so long as the electronic walls 
that safeguard it prevent outside breaches. Moreover, the home is often 
not a suitable place for inner exploration, because one must sometimes 
venture far outside the home (either physically or through cyberspace) to 
obtain resources that are sometimes crucial for reflecting upon, and 
addressing, intellectual and emotional needs: books or other cultural 
 
 200. 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (quoting id. at 401 (White, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 201. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in Virtual 
Reality, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1141, 1192–93 (2008).  
 202. Indeed, the Court has made it clear that warrantless visual surveillance of the home’s 
windows from a public street does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001) (noting that historically, visual surveillance from outside the home was 
considered clearly lawful because “the eye cannot . . . be guilty of a trespass” (quoting Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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sources from outside, discussions with therapists or religious counselors, 
and other sources of guidance. Indeed, in some cases, an individual may 
find that free thought and intellectual exploration require not a retreat 
into the home, but an escape from it. Consider the case of a young man 
or woman like the protagonist of The Chosen who needed to make secret 
trips to the public library to explore a secular world that was forbidden 
territory in his family’s strict religious environment.203 Or the young man 
profiled in a New York Times story who furtively uses the Internet to 
find and read materials that help him live with, and reflect upon, his 
homosexuality.204 For such individuals, home life interferes with, rather 
than supports, their freedom of thought. 
If it is not the nature of the home considered by itself that justifies 
the First Amendment shield raised by Stanley, it may be that there is also 
something else about the home that does so—namely, its special status in 
social convention and history. Even if the role the home plays in our lives 
is not unique, and even if we can find places outside the home in which 
we feel more comfortable and safe from others’ observation, these other 
places—for better or worse—do not have the same historically and 
legally significant pedigree that the private residence has acquired over 
the centuries. 
In this respect, one might argue, the freedom-of-thought protection 
that Stanley recognizes in the home is quite similar to the protections 
provided by the public forum doctrine to “traditional public forums.” 
This doctrine sets aside for unfettered debate and dialogue, certain 
government-owned property, most notably, streets and parks.205 While 
the government may impose content-based speech restrictions on much 
of the public property it operates—for example, it may bar protests in 
military bases or disallow disruptive speech in public schools206—it 
generally may not impose such restrictions in streets and parks. The 
reason is not simply because of the nature of streets and parks, but 
because of the tradition that surrounds them. As the Court said in the 
case that launched the development of the public forum doctrine, the 
1939 case of Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, “use of the 
streets and public places [for unfettered discussion] has, from ancient 
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of 
 
 203. Chaim Potok, The Chosen 86–87 (1967) (describing a young man who secretly visits the 
public library to escape from an Orthodox Jewish household so that he can read secular literature). 
 204. Jennifer Egan, Lonely Gay Teen Seeking Same: How Jeffrey Found Friendship, Sex, 
Heartache—and Himself—Online, N.Y. Times (Magazine), Dec. 10, 2000, at 110. 
 205. See supra text accompanying note 171. 
 206. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that regulations barring political rallies 
or demonstrations in a military base were constitutional under the First Amendment); DeFabio v. E. 
Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 623 F.3d 71, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Student speech . . . may be 
restricted if the speech will ‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the 
school.’” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969))). 
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citizens.”207 As I have noted elsewhere,208 this claim was a misleading one: 
in the late nineteenth- to early twentieth-century, managers of public 
parks in America often barred political, religious, and commercial speech 
from parks on the ground that parks were supposed to be places for 
peaceful relaxation.209 Thus, the Court in Hague was not simply giving 
legal recognition to a pre-existing social convention, but rather creatively 
and selectively using the social convention surrounding parks to satisfy a 
perceived constitutional need, namely, the First Amendment need for 
some space where individuals might meet, debate, or protest, and where 
they could not simply be silenced by a government edict denying them a 
place to speak or listen. The Court in Stanley, one might argue, did 
precisely the same thing for the home: It drew upon strong social norms 
of home privacy to answer a constitutional need it perceived for some 
space in which individuals could read books, watch videos, or engage in 
other cultural activities free from worries that doing so could easily 
trigger state interference. 
Moreover, one might argue, the public forum doctrine also provides 
a model for refusing to extend Stanley’s protection beyond its original 
boundary lines. Many commentators have noted that people now 
typically seek debate and reading materials not in parks but on the Web 
or through other electronic media.210 Along with at least one Supreme 
Court Justice (Justice Kennedy), commentators have called for updating 
the public forum doctrine to include these new forums for debate and 
deliberation.211 But the majority of the Court has disagreed,212 perhaps 
because while the public forum doctrine has First Amendment benefits, 
the rules of the traditional public forum weaken the government’s law-
making ability; to allow these rules to spill beyond traditional categories 
might thus weaken government power in many areas where it needs to 
be robust. The same might be argued about Stanley: It makes sense to 
limit it to the traditional confines of the home, even as certain features of 
home life migrate into electronic realms, because a constitutional limit on 
 
 207. 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
 208. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, 
the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to Receive Information, 
74 UMKC L. Rev. 799, 834–36 (2006). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Note, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in 
the Electronic Environment, 12 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 149, 200–01 (1998). 
 211. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802–03 (1996) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Minds 
are not changed in streets and parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant 
interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in mass and electronic media.”). 
 212. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (advocating for the creation of public forums in cyberspace, administered by the State, to 
provide the electronic equivalent of the sidewalks in the physical world). 
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government power as disabling as Stanley’s should not be lightly 
extended. 
There are, however, two problems with this argument for limiting 
Stanley to the home and denying its protections to our private 
interactions in cyberspace. First, the same strategy has not entirely 
succeeded in the public forum doctrine. The Court has officially refused 
to extend the protection of the traditional public forum doctrine beyond 
streets and parks.213 However, it has provided an extension of sorts, 
quietly and unofficially, by creating a new rule that provides traditional 
public forum-type protections to other government-owned properties. In 
the 2001 case of Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, it announced a rule 
that even with respect to properties where the government has more 
leeway to regulate speech, it may not use this leeway to “use an existing 
medium of expression and to control it . . . in ways which distort its usual 
functioning.”214 Consequently, even where government property does 
not, like parks or streets, have a long historical tradition of setting it 
aside for unfettered speech, it may still have certain social practices 
associated with it that present a barrier to certain kinds of speech 
regulations. Because such limits on speech regulation arise from the 
inherent nature of public property itself, rather than from government 
designation, the government cannot remove them simply by declaring 
such property a non-public forum. For example, in Velazquez, the Court 
held that barring lawyers from making certain kinds of arguments would 
distort the expression that lawyers must engage in to serve as effective 
advocates.215 One might argue that the Court should consider similar 
measures in understanding the reach of Stanley. Even if no environment 
can provide the same protection for freedom of thought that the home 
has been held to provide, other environments might play an important, 
albeit more specific or limited, role in protecting or advancing our 
freedom to think, and would be disabled from doing so by certain kinds 
of government limits. Such institutions may include libraries, counseling 
centers, or other places in public life that people often go to engage in 
private reflection that may not be possible in their homes. 
This difficulty with holding fast to the present, very narrow limits of 
Stanley is closely connected with a second problem. However appealingly 
simple it might be to limit Stanley’s reach to a single, easily identifiable 
environment, such simplicity is unjustified if it fails to protect the 
freedom Stanley was meant to assure. Freedom of thought might 
intuitively be threatened not only by intrusions into home life, but also 
by other government invasions into individuals’ attempts to shape their 
 
 213. Id. at 679 (refusing to find that airports are public fora similar to streets and parks). 
 214. 531 U.S. 533, 542–43 (2001). 
 215. Id. at 544 (“[The State] may not design a subsidy to effect [a] serious and fundamental 
restriction on advocacy of attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary.”). 
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own psyche—for example, by government limits on or monitoring of the 
books individuals read outside of the homes, of the counseling sessions 
they seek with therapists or other sources of guidance, or of cultural 
exploration they engage in at libraries, theaters, or on websites. Again, a 
Fourth Amendment example—this time, from the realm of Fourth 
Amendment scholarship—is helpful here. As Anthony Amsterdam said, 
in criticizing Fourth Amendment cases that permitted the government to 
engage in aerial surveillance (with high magnification cameras) of certain 
in-home environments, the Fourth Amendment has not provided enough 
protection from police surveillance when it provides such protection only 
to those who “retir[e] to the cellar, cloa[k] all the windows with thick 
caulking, tur[n] off the lights and remai[n] absolutely quiet.”216 A similar 
observation might be made about the limits courts have placed on the 
scope of Stanley. Indeed, such an observation has been made by Justice 
Hugo Black.217 Stanley, he argued, will be of little value if it protects a 
person only when he “writes salacious books in his attic, prints them in 
his basement, and reads them in his living room.”218  
To update Black’s complaint with modern examples, how 
meaningful is an individual’s First Amendment right to read the book of 
their choice in her own home if she is not protected from government-
mandated remote deletion of an illegally obscene eBook? How protected 
is she in the right to privately possess her own video in an age where the 
only place she can feasibly store such a video is in a digital medium that 
is inevitably linked to the data channels of the outside world—and where 
information is increasingly stored in, and not simply sent through, servers 
outside of the home? As Judge Gregory recently noted in dissenting 
from a refusal to provide a rehearing en banc for a defendant convicted, 
in part, for an e-mail describing a sexual fantasy: “In today’s world, our 
e-mail inbox, just as much as our home, has become the place where we 
store the ‘memorabilia of [our] thoughts and dreams,’ and the same 
principles that animated Stanley call now for Stanley’s extension to” such 
technology.219 
 
 216. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 402 
(1974). 
 217. United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 382 (1971) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
 218. Id. 
 219. United States v. Whorley, 569 F.3d 211, 214 (4th Cir. 2009) (Gregory, J., dissenting), denying 
reh’g en banc to 550 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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Conclusion 
 
His stove had reverted. Back to an ancient Buck natural-
gas model with clogged burners and encrusted oven 
door . . . . The TV set had receded back a long way; he 
found himself confronted by a dark, wood-cabinet, 
Atwater-Kent tuned radio-frequency oldtime AM 
radio . . . . The vidphone had been replaced by a black, 
hook-style, upright telephone. Pre dial. 
—Philip K. Dick, Ubik220 
 
I look around and see only what’s obsolete 
The early versions of things in redesign 
—The Loud Family, Backward Century221 
 
For almost all of the forty years since it has been decided, Stanley v. 
Georgia has been widely cited for its ringing endorsement of freedom of 
thought. It has also been largely isolated from the rest of First 
Amendment law and frozen in time, covering only the late-Sixties 
technology of its era. For example, it strongly protects the right to read 
the book of one’s choice in the privacy of one’s living room, but may not 
protect the right to read an eBook beamed wirelessly from the outside 
world to a digital reading device. It protects the right to view a film on an 
old-fashioned projector, but probably would not protect the right to store 
and view a video the way viewers increasingly watch them, by accessing a 
video file stored in a far-away server and running it on one’s own 
computer or mobile device. And it protects the physical spaces that 
shield intimate activities and communication, but not their functional 
equivalents in virtual worlds or cyberspace storage lockers. 
I have argued that there is little sense in continuing to view Stanley 
as an isolated, unchanging island, separated from the public world. As 
with Fourth Amendment search and seizure law, as transformed by Katz 
v. United States, courts should abandon the fiction that our private 
internal and expressive lives remain hidden inside of our privately owned 
houses and buildings. The Court in Katz recognized that the “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects” must be understood to encompass the 
electronic environments and channels that evolved to serve many of the 
same functions. As noted above, the First Amendment public forum 
doctrine has too: Although the Court has refused to expand the 
definition of “traditional public forum” beyond streets and parks, it has 
 
 220. Dick, supra note 1, at 724, 726. 
 221. The Loud Family, Backward Century, on Attractive Nuisance (Alias Records 2000). 
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nonetheless extended First Amendment protection to new environments 
like the Internet by recognizing their special place in First Amendment 
law,222 and by warning the government that the Constitution bars it from 
distorting “the usual functioning of a medium of communication.”223 The 
freedom of thought safeguarded in Stanley likewise deserves to be saved 
from becoming an anachronism. Like freedom from unreasonable 
searches and freedom to speak in public, the freedom to think and 
receive information privately deserves to be staunchly protected from 
state censors—and to be protected in the spaces where we exercise this 
freedom now, not only those where we exercised it forty years ago. 
As I have shown, moreover, courts do not need to revolutionize 
First Amendment law to update and salvage Stanley. They must merely 
recognize that in the online world of the twenty-first century, it is no 
longer plausible to offer First Amendment protection to an individual’s 
personal library only on the condition that she keep that library separate 
from, and unconnected to, the Internet. Even the most private reading 
and film viewing is no longer easy to isolate from the network of 
computers outside the home. Courts must recognize that possessing and 
viewing a film increasingly entails having it transmitted into one’s home 
over electronic channels. The act of distribution, in other words, can no 
longer be disentangled from that of reading, viewing, or simply 
possessing cultural materials. State punishment of the former thus, 
necessarily imposes censorship of the latter—and imposes precisely the 
kind of harm Stanley was meant to prevent. 
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